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Towards Just Resilience: representing and including new constituencies in adaptive 
governance and law. 
Margherita Pieraccini1 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Resilience has become a key concept in the era of global environmental change in both 
academic and policy circles. In the field of ecology, its roots lie in the works on predation by 
Holling.2 Holling demonstrated that ecosystems, rather than oscillating around a single 
equilibrium, could shift between multiple stable states and were complex and adaptive and 
constantly confronted by the unexpected. Since the work of Holling, resilience has been defined 
in multiple ways, to the point that some scholars attribute to it the same qualities of a ‘boundary 
object’. The concept of boundary object derives from the Science and Technology literature 
and it is used to refer to terms facilitating communication between different parties or 
disciplines by creating shared vocabulary without requiring full agreement regarding its precise 
meaning. 3 Many social scientists have adopted the concept of resilience in the context of 
Holling’s definition to study social-ecological systems, examining the complex relationship 
and interdependence between ecological and social systems.4 A social-ecological system is a 
system of biophysical and social factors interacting at different temporal and geographical 
scales in a non-linear way.5  
  
                                                          
1 Reader in Law, University of Bristol Law School. E-mail: m.pieraccini@bristol.ac.uk. 
2 CS Holling, ‘Resilience and Stability of Ecological Systems’ (1973) 4 Annual Review of Ecology and 
Systematics 1, 1. There are other disciplines, such as psychology or mathematics, which employ the term 
resilience. This paper is not concerned with such disciplines. For the origin and use of resilience in these 
disciplines, see GE Richardson, ‘The Metatheory of Resilience and Resiliency’ (2002) 58 J Clin Psychol 307; LH 
Gunderson and CS Holling (eds), Panarchy: Understanding Transformations in Human and Natural Systems 
(Island Press 2002).  
3 Fridolin Brand & Kurt Jax, ‘Focusing the Meaning(s) of Resilience: Resilience as a Descriptive Object and 
Boundary Concept’ (2007) 12(1) Ecology & Society 23.  
4 W Neil Adger, ‘Social and Ecological Resilience: Are They Related?’ (2000) 24 Progress in Human Geography 
347; Carl Folke, ‘Resilience: The Emergence of a Perspective for Social–Ecological Systems Analyses’ (2006) 
16 Global Environmental Change 253. Resilience has been also used by other social scientists since the 1970s and 
1980s in the field of psychology with different connotations. See Ann  Masten, Ordinary Magic: Resilience in 
Development (Guilford Press 2014). For a discussion of the multiple definitions of resilience and its use both as a 
normative and descriptive concept, see Jacopo Baggio, Katrina Brown and Denis Hellebrandt, ‘Boundary Object 
or Bridging Concept? A Citation Network Analysis of Resilience’ (2015) 20(2) Ecology and Society 2.  
5 Firket Berkes and Carl Folke (eds), Linking Social and Ecological Systems: Management Practices and Social 
Mechanisms for Building Resilience (CUP 1998); Charles Redman and others, ‘Integrating Social Science into 
the Long-Term Ecological Research (LTER) Network: Social Dimensions of Ecological Change and Ecological 
Dimensions of Social Change’ (2004) 7 Ecosystems 161; Elinor Ostrom, ‘A General Framework for Analyzing 




Adaptive governance has been singled out as the most appropriate strategy to build the 
resilience of social-ecological systems. Although there is no single definition of adaptive 
governance, at its core adaptive governance is a system of governance that does not aim at 
controlling/avoiding change but  aims at managing uncertainty and complexity in social-
ecological systems with a view to promote resilience and sustainable development.6 Proponents 
of the adaptive governance approach argue that learning and experimentation should be a 
shared enterprise requiring the collaboration of regulators and regulatees and emphasise the 
role of participation in decision-making.7 However, the democratic potential of adaptive 
governance remains under-explored in much of the literature as the question of who should be 
represented and why has not been fully addressed from a normative viewpoint.  
 
This article provides a novel contribution to the existing adaptive governance literature and to 
its emphasis on participation by answering the question of inclusion and representation in 
resilience decision-making drawing on political theories of justice and green political thinking 
and making a case for the representation of new constituencies such as nature and/or future 
generations. The lack of attention paid to these new constituencies in the resilience literature 
on participation is somewhat surprising given that resilience literature is built on a recognition 
of the intertwined nature of social-ecological systems and recognises the importance of both 
biophysical and social factors in shaping responses to uncertainty across temporal as well as 
geographical scales. This article therefore presents a first attempt at filling this academic gap, 
developing a perspective of what is termed here “just resilience”. In so doing, it reflects on the 
challenges of such endeavour. This article is primarily concerned with setting out the 
theoretical argument, leaving to future work the task to suggest how specific sectors of 
environmental law could make strides towards accommodating just resilience. 
 
The article is structured as follows: section 2 introduces the scholarship on resilience and the 
way in which the theme of participation in decision-making has been dealt with within that 
literature, section 3 brings justice considerations into the argument by drawing on political 
theories of justice and making a case to focus on procedural justice. Section 4 draws together 
                                                          
6 Thomas Dietz, Elinor Ostrom, and Paul Stern, ‘The Struggle to Govern the Commons’ (2003) 302 Science 1907; 
Brian Chaffin, Hannah Gosnell and Barbara Cosens, ‘A Decade of Adaptive Governance Scholarship: Synthesis 
and Future Directions’, (2014) 19(3) Ecology and Society 56.  
7 See, Ryan Plummer and others, ‘Adaptive Co-Management: a Systematic Review and Analysis’ (2012) 17(3) 
Ecology and Society 11; Lindsay Stringeret and others, ‘Unpacking “Participation” in the Adaptive Management 




the resilience perspective with ecocentric procedural justice scholarship, drawing on critical 
green political thinking and outlining the key traits of a ‘just resilience’ perspective. Section 5 
offers conclusive remarks.   
 
2.  RESILIENCE, ADAPTIVE GOVERNANCE AND ADAPTIVE 
MANAGEMENT 
The realisation that social-ecological systems are changing, often in unpredictable ways, has 
resulted in the concept of resilience gaining prominence in the last few decades. Given the large 
body of literature introducing the resilience perspective,8 there is no need for another summary. 
Suffice here to say that the resilience perspective contemplates systemic persistence while 
acknowledging uncertainty, surprise and change. Resilient systems respond to disturbance 
through learning and innovation, thereby enabling the system to adapt to threats and to 
transform if a system regime becomes untenable. In the field of ecology, the resilience 
perspective has its origins in the work of Holling in the 1970s proposing that ecosystems can 
be found in one of many alternative stable states ,9 therefore questioning the predominant 
single-equilibrium view of ecosystems.10 Holling defined resilience as ‘the persistence of 
relationships within a system and is a measure of the ability of these systems to absorb changes 
of state variables, driving variables, and parameters, and still persist’.11  Resilience, therefore 
is the ecosystem’s resistance to state shift. For Holling, the resilience perspective requires a 
‘qualitative capacity to devise systems that can absorb and accommodate future events in 
whatever unexpected form they may take’.12 The emphasis is on the ability of systems to cope 
with uncertainty and change without shifting state.  
 
In time, the resilience perspective has also entered the social sciences and has been applied to 
the study of social-ecological systems.13  Applying the perspective of resilience to the study of 
                                                          
8 See, for instance, Lance Gunderson, ‘Ecological Resilience: in Theory and Application’, (2000) 31 Annual 
Review of Ecology and Systematics 425; Marten Scheffer, Critical Transitions in Nature and Society (Princeton 
UP 2009). 
9 In ecology, states are the set of unique biotic and abiotic factors making up an ecosystem. 
10 Holling (n 1). 
11 ibid 17. 
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13 Lance Gunderson, and CS Holling (eds) Panarchy: Understanding Transformations in Human and Natural 
Systems. (Island Press 2002); Carl Folke, ‘Resilience: the Emergence of a Perspective for Social–Ecological 
Systems Analyses’ (2006) 16 Global Environmental Change 253; Brian Walker and others, ‘Resilience 
Management in Social-Ecological Systems: a Working Hypothesis for a Participatory Approach’ (2002) 6(1) 
Ecology and Society 14, Carl Folke and others, ‘Resilience Thinking: Integrating Resilience, Adaptability and 




social–ecological systems requires an incorporation of the ideas of adaptation, through learning 
and innovation and of transformation as well an acknowledgement of broad temporal and 
spatial scales, given the cross-scalar interplays between the components of the systems. The 
focus is on multiscalar, reciprocal influences and feedback mechanisms. Interdependency is at 
the core of the concept of a system, which differs from the concept of a set consisting of the 
addition/aggregation of different elements.14  The boundaries of a system, unquestionably, vary 
depending on the context of study.15  Therefore, the resilience of a social-ecological systems 
consists in the capacity to absorb perturbations of a human or ecological origin and to adapt 
while preserving its coherence and function and to transform when a system becomes 
unsustainable. Clearly, the resilience of a system is not always a desirable status (eg persistence 
of a state of poverty or of a malaria swamp). There can be positive or negative resilience. These 
normative distinctions are anthropocentric values placed on the resilience of a system. The 
focus of this article is on positive resilience understood as the capacity of a social-ecological 
system to support both ecosystem services, long-term structural ecosystem qualities and social 
sustainability. In the context of global environmental change, where attention is placed on 
adaptation and uncertainty, building the resilience of social-ecological systems becomes the 
ultimate goal. 
 
The resilience perspective has strong implications for rethinking governance and law. If much 
of existing environmental governance and law has been based on an outdated ecological view 
underlined by principles of stability,16 resilience scholars have been arguing for a move towards 
adaptive governance. With shifting baselines and unpredictable radical ecological change, 
governance strategies aimed at the minimisation or mitigation of ecological damage to maintain 
or restore the integrity of natural resources in specific areas have become inadequate. For 
example, in writing about a new climate change adaptation regime for the regulation of 
environmental resources in the United States, Craig argues that ecological stationarity, 
embodied in the current preservationist and restoration regulatory paradigms, is ill-suited to 
                                                          
14 Maurizio Cafagno, Principi e Strumenti di Tutela Ambientale come Sistema Complesso, Adattativo, Comune 
(Giappichelli 2007).   
15 See for example Brian Walker and others, ‘Exploring Resilience in Social-Ecological Systems Through 
Comparative Studies and Theory Development: Introduction to the Special Issue’ (2006) 11(1) Ecology and 
Society 12. 
16 A Dan Tarlock, ‘The Nonequilibrium Paradigm in Ecology and the Partial Unravelling of Environmental Law’ 
(1994) 27 Loyola of Los Angeles L Rev 1121; Robin Craig and JB Ruhl, ‘Designing Administrative Law for 




promote adaptation to climate change.17 This is because the preservationist paradigm enshrined 
in much environmental law requires solid knowledge of both 1) baseline conditions, which is 
not always available and 2) sources of impacts so these can be subject to impact assessments 
to value their consequences on the environment, which are not easily identifiable in the case of 
diffuse pollution and global environmental change. The current legal culture relies substantially 
on rational planning and ‘front-end’ regulatory tools employed before the taking of a decision. 
Impact assessments, both regulatory and environmental, are a typical example of such ‘front-
end’ regulation as they are premised on the possibility to predict costs and benefits of particular 
regulatory choices or environmental impacts of particular strategies or projects prior to their 
occurrence.  Once choices are made, they become definitive. This mode of regulation therefore 
obstructs long term regulatory flexibility. As Craig argues, then,  
environmental and natural resources law in a climate change adaptation era require fundamental re-
visioning, because both regulatory goals and the legal mechanisms for accomplishing them will have 
to be centred on the concept of change itself.18  
Rather than control/minimising change, environmental governance in the context of global 
environmental change should focus more on shaping the ability of a system to cope with and 
adapt to change. Consequently, adaptive governance has been advocated as the key regulatory 
approach to build resilience because it champions collaboration, flexibility, learning and 
experimentation at multiple scales. 19 
 
The concept of adaptive governance was first developed by Dietz and others in a paper on 
common pool resources.20 The authors defined adaptive governance as a way to confront the 
challenges of governance in the face of uncertainty at multiple levels. A number of 
requirements for adaptive governance were identified and the means to meet them. Analytical 
deliberation to foster trust and improve the knowledge base for decision-making was listed as 
a means to meet the criteria for adaptive governance. Adaptive governance entered the 
resilience literature a year later with the seminal paper by Walker and others in which a clear 
distinction was made between adaptive governance and adaptive management, with the former 
conceptualised as the evolution of rules that influence resilience during self-organisation and 
                                                          
17 Robin  Craig, “Stationarity is Dead”—Long Live Transformation: Five Principles for Climate Change 
Adaptation Law (2010) 34 Harvard Env L Rev 9. 
18 ibid, 30. 
19 Carl Folke and others, ‘Adaptive Governance of Social-Ecological Systems’ (2005) 30 Annual Review of 
Environment and Resources 441. 




the latter as flexible management practice to retain critical ecological resources.21 The 
subsequent resilience literature has continued to employ the concepts of adaptive governance 
as well as adaptive management. Although there is no unified definition of adaptive governance 
and adaptive management and no single understanding of the relationship between the two 
terms, 22 this article follows the view proposed by Folke and others that adaptive management 
is a way to operationalise adaptive governance, the latter conceptualised as the structure and 
processes of decision-making.23  
 
The concept of adaptive management was initially rendered popular in the 1970s and 1980s 
with Holling and Walters. 24  These resilience scholars argued that adaptive management is a 
structured process (a learning cycle) to identify and deal with critical uncertainties in natural 
resource management and design management experiments to reduce these uncertainties. They 
identified six steps of the adaptive management process: initial definition and assessment of 
the management problem, taking stock of current knowledge, identify uncertainties, 
implementation of measures, monitoring and evaluation.25 The circular nature of the process 
means that evaluation will feed back into the assessment of the problem and the learning cycle 
will start again.  Adaptive management differs from a ‘trial and error’ approach in that it is 
more procedurally structured.  
 
Despite the various definitions and variations of adaptive management in place today, a number 
of core elements of the adaptive management approach can be identified. These are its process-
oriented, ongoing, experimental and iterative nature and the emphasis on monitoring, 
reviewing and re-assessing to provide management solutions in the face of unpredictable 
change. Resilience scholars therefore argue that adaptive management requires iterative laws 
and regulations and a move away from ‘front-end’ towards ‘back-end’ regulation.   This means, 
in the words of Ruhl, that  
                                                          
21 Brian Walker and others, ‘Resilience, adaptability and transformability in social–ecological systems’(2004) 
9(2) Ecology and Society 5. 
22 Ryan Plummer, Derek Armitage and Rob de Loe ‘Adaptive Co-Management and Its Relationship to 
Environmental Governance’ (2013) 18(1) Ecology and Society 21; Lyndal Hasselman, ‘Adaptive Management; 
Adaptive Co-Management and Adaptive Governance? What’s the Difference?’ (2017) 24 Australasian J of Env 
Management 31. 
23  Folke and others (n 19). 
24 CS Holling, Adaptive Environmental Assessment and Management (John Wiley and Sons 1978); CJ Walters,  





the more a program directs administrative action towards fixing long-term policies and decisions 
based on pre-regulatory analysis, the more “front-end” it is. Adaptive management requires the 
institutionalization of monitoring-adjustment frameworks that allow incremental policy and decision 
adjustments at the ‘back end’, where performance results can be evaluated and the new information 
can be feedback into the ongoing regulatory processes. 26 
Such iterative, flexible regulatory practice is often portrayed as a collective effort in the 
literature that has merged the insights of adaptive management with those of the co-
management literature.27 Adaptive co-management brings together the dynamic learning of 
adaptive management with linkages required for cooperative and collaborative management to 
cope with uncertainty and change drawing on multiple knowledges. However, if adaptive 
management is about the scientific method-based approach for applying experiments to a 
policy, adaptive co-management is conceptually closer to adaptive governance in discussing 
participatory and adaptive systems of management. Therefore, the conceptual boundaries 
between the adaptive governance literature and the adaptive co-management literature are 
tenuous, with scholars using the terms interchangeably. The key distinction is between adaptive 
governance as the broader governance apparatus and adaptive management as the operational 
tool.    
 
Both the adaptive governance and the adaptive management scholars have emphasised the 
importance of participation in decision-making.28 However, they have not engaged in-depth 
with normative questions related to the type of actors and representations made in decision-
making fora.  Much of the existing literature has been underpinned by an instrumentalist rather 
than by a normative logic in advocating for participation. Indeed, this literature often links 
participation in decision-making to a discussion of processes of knowledge gathering to 
improve systemic resilience. Participation is characterised as a means to build on multiple 
knowledges (scientific and lay) in order to better face uncertainty and as a means to build trust 
among communities to ensure systemic resilience.29 The majority of resilience scholars have 
not been preoccupied with power relations, issues of legitimacy and accountability of resilience 
                                                          
26 JB Ruhl, ‘Regulation by Adaptive Management-Is it Possible?’ (2005) 7 Minnesota J of Law, Science and 
Technology 21. 
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Social Learning’ (2009) 90 J of Environmental Management 1692.  
28 Dave Huitema and others, ‘Adaptive Water Governance: Assessing the Institutional Prescriptions of Adaptive 
(Co-) Management from a Governance Perspective and Defining a Research Agenda’ (2009) 14(1) Ecology and 
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interventions in discussing adaptive governance.30 Critical scholars, primarily from the field of 
political ecology,  have argued that resilience scholarship has neglected the question of 
‘resilience for whom and by whom?’, not considering the power relations and power 
(in)balances shaping resilience decision-making.31 These scholars have argued that resilience 
thinking would benefit from internalising social science insights on power relations and agency 
in discussing adaptive governance and social-environmental change. This is because resilience 
is not a neutral term but it is, much like its precursor sustainable development, a value-laden 
term. Indeed, not everyone benefits equally or bears the same risks and responsibilities from 
different pathways to resilience, potentially leading to distributive injustices.  Recognising 
resilience as political also points to the importance of inclusive debates on the meanings and 
pathways to resilience, thereby requiring an in-depth consideration of procedural justice, 
especially the issue of inclusion and representation in resilience decision-making as this article 
will show when introducing the justice literature.  
 
Legal literature on resilience has responded to the criticisms by making the fundamental point 
that legal regimes need to maintain legitimacy whilst securing adaptive governance. As Cosens, 
a legal scholar writing on resilience, points out ‘the introduction of flexibility to ecosystem 
management challenges traditional sources of legitimacy, thus presenting a barrier to adoption 
of new approaches’.32  From an administrative law viewpoint, flexibility and experimentalism 
in the adaptive governance approach bring legitimacy and accountability challenges. As Craig 
and others argue, flexibility in adaptive governance brings in the problem of regulation being 
perceived as ‘perpetually destabilizing, disruptive and unfair’.33  This is exacerbated by the fact 
that adaptive governance is often thought as involving multiple scales and some devolution of 
decision-making power to unelected groups. Cosens draws on Esty’s sources of legitimacy34 
                                                          
30   Melissa Leach (eds) Re-framing Resilience: a Symposium Report (STEPS 2008); Raven Cretney, ‘Resilience 
for Whom? Emerging Critical Geographies of Socio-ecological Resilience’ (2014) 8 Geography Compass 627; 
Katrina Brown, ‘Global environmental change I: A Social Turn for Resilience?’ (2014) 38 Progress in Human 
Geography 107; Katrina Brown, Resilience, Development and Global Change (Routledge 2016). 
31 Betsy Beymer-Farris and others, ‘Promises and Pitfalls of Adaptive Management in Resilience Thinking: the 
Lens of Political Ecology’ In Tobia Plieninger and Claudia Bieling (eds) Resilience in the Cultural Landscape 
(CUP 2012); Muriel Cote and Andrea  Nightingale, ‘Resilience Thinking Meets Social Theory: Situation Social 
Change in Social-Ecological Systems’ (2012) 36 Progress in Human Geography 472; Alf Honborg, ‘Revelations 
of Resilience: from the Ideological Disarmament of Disaster to the Revolutionary Implications of (P)anarchy’ 
(2013) 1 Resilience 116.   
32 Barbara Cosens, ‘Legitimacy, Adaptation, and Resilience in Ecosystem Management’ (2013) 18(1) Ecology 
and Society 3; Cretney (n 30); Brown (n 30). 
33 Robin Craig and others, ‘Balancing Stability and Flexibility in Adaptive Governance: an Analysis of Tools 
Available in U.S. Environmental Law’ (2017) 22(2) Ecology and Society 3.  





to inject legitimacy considerations into adaptive governance. These sources include, inter alia, 
deliberative legitimacy, defined as the ‘expectation of public comment and dialogue in 
numerous aspects of agency decision-making’35 and transparency requirements. Participation 
therefore becomes linked to the concept of legitimacy in such literature and not (only) to 
processes of knowledge-gathering for better outcomes. This is also clear in very recent 
literature in search for legal and institutional foundations for adaptive environmental 
governance, which restates the importance of public participation to secure legitimacy.36 These 
articles move beyond a purely instrumental understanding of participation that characterised 
earlier literature and ‘legitimise’ adaptive governance. 
 
However, even these writings have not explored in depth issues of inclusion and representation 
in decision-making. Who should get represented and why are fundamental normative questions 
that deserve more attention. This article, drawing on critical theories of environmental justice, 
attempts to fill this gap, shifting the discussion from legitimacy, as interpreted by  Cosens,37 to 
procedural justice and representation in resilience decision-making. Compared to a view based 
on legitimacy as social acceptance and participation as a key instrument for fostering 
legitimacy, a critical environmental justice perspective enables us to better advocate for the 
inclusion and representation of new constituencies beyond human beings.  
 
3 TOWARDS JUST RESILIENCE 
3.1 Procedural Justice  
As discussed above, if resilience scholars have emphasised participatory decision-making in 
both adaptive governance and management, they have done so primarily from an instrumental 
perspective with participation understood as a means to reinforcing the knowledge base and 
securing positive outcomes when taking decisions in an uncertain world.38 More recently, law 
and resilience academics have moved beyond such instrumentalist focus linking participation 
to legitimacy, defined as social acceptance of a decision, and thus necessarily anthropocentric.  
However, given that in resilience studies we are concerned with social-ecological systems, it 
is argued here that such anthropocentric stance is problematic. Analyses should move beyond 
                                                          
35 Barbara Cosens and others, ‘Identifying Legal, Ecological and Governance Obstacles, and Opportunities for 
Adapting to Climate Change’ (2014) 6 Sustainability 2338, 2351. 
36 Daniel de Caro and others, ‘Legal and Institutional Foundations of Adaptive Environmental Governance’ (2017) 
22(1) Ecology and Society 32; Barabara Cosens and others, ‘The Role of Law in Adaptive Governance’ (2017) 
22(1) Ecology and Society 30; Craig and others (n 33). 
37 Cosens ‘Legitimacy, Adaptation and Resilience’ (n 32).  




a purely anthropocentric focus and be concerned also with nature itself, rather than with 
different social groups only. Secondly and relatedly, the existing resilience literature has not 
investigated in depth who should be involved in decision-making and why. References tend to 
be made to stakeholders and/or the public, but without discussing in depth which interests are 
to be represented and by whom and why. 
 
A justice perspective can enable us to overcome such shortcomings by providing a more in-
depth justification for the recognition of plural interests in decision-making and by moving 
beyond an anthropocentric bias. The first question to ask is what dimension of justice should 
be considered. Should discussions be centred on procedural or distributive dimensions of 
justice? That is to say, should discussions be centred on issues of recognition and participation 
(procedural dimension) or on the distribution of social-ecological goods and bads now and in 
the future (distributive dimension)? The focus, it is argued here should be on procedural justice 
due to pragmatic and theoretical reasons.  The pragmatic justification for focussing on 
procedural justice is rooted in the resilience perspective itself. The systemic view of resilience 
scholarship highlights the existence of multiple physical and social scales contributing to the 
production and reproduction of a dynamic social-ecological system. As there is not one just 
society or one just environment, it becomes impossible answering distributive justice questions 
a priori. It is impossible at the outset to decide whether just distribution should require a balance 
between the costs of protection measures to (human) stakeholders and the costs of human 
interventions (eg project developments) to nature in the present and/or in the future. Also, it 
cannot be decided a priori whether the benefits and costs should be distributed equally between 
current and future generations, or whether global interests should be put in front of local ones. 
What is just distribution in a social-ecological system will change depending on the adaptation 
and transformation of the systemic components and the scales under consideration. Besides, if 
some environmental protection measures benefit both the environment and society through the 
provision of ecosystem services, environmental protection can be beneficial to protected 
species and habitats, but negative to socio-economic development. This means that the 
resilience of the natural system may undermine that of the social system or vice versa. Also, it 
could well be that the same environmental protection measures that are beneficial to the 
environment and provide ecosystem services to society as a whole and/or to future generations 
negatively impact on individuals or a defined category of stakeholders. Hence the social 
system, like the natural one, is plural: there is not just one society interacting with one 




be many societies, depending on the time frame employed (short-term, long term) and 
depending on the scale at which we are focussing (individual/group). Consequently, how the 
costs/benefits of environmental interventions are to be socially and ecologically distributed 
requires collective answers at different decision-making scales that are updated depending on 
the changing context. The substantive goals are both fluid and contextual. Therefore, instead 
of focussing on defining just goals in a complex system, attention should first be placed on 
procedural justice issues and in particular wide inclusion of actors in decision-making 
processes in order to collectively deliberate on the parameters of just distribution, given the 
multiple scales and interests at play and societal-ecological differences.  It is through the wide 
inclusion of interests in on-going decision-making for a that discussion on just distributions in 
complex systems can be made.   
 
Theoretically, the focus on procedural justice and wide inclusion is also supported by critical 
political scientists. The causal link between procedural and distributive justice has been made 
explicit in the deliberative democratic theories of justice of Young and Fraser and most 
recently, in green political theory, especially the works of Schlosberg on environmental justice, 
as reviewed below.39 Young has recognised and criticised the fact that most classic theories of 
justice have been preoccupied solely with distributive justice concerns, following Rawlsian 
footsteps.40 For Rawls, justice is about the fair distribution of social advantages. 41 For Young, 
it is not sufficient to address distributive injustice. but it is necessary to look at the underlying 
causes producing such injustices.42 Young argues that equating justice with distribution is an 
exercise in reductionism because part of the problem of unjust distribution is the lack of 
recognition of group difference and related lack of inclusion in decision-making.43 Lack of 
recognition of particular groups due to dominant cultural discourses and institutional practices 
determines their marginalisation in the political community potentially leading to unjust 
distribution as the interested of the marginalised groups are not represented. The guiding 
question of a theory of justice is no longer how and what can be distributed but how does unjust 
distribution occur. This shift requires attention to be paid to the cultural and institutional 
constraints that disable the achievement of distributive justice. Patterns of under-representation 
                                                          
39 Iris Young Inclusion and Democracy (OUP 2000); Nancy Fraser, Justice Interruptus: Critical Reflections on 
the “Postsocialist” Condition (Routledge 1997); David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice: Theories, 
Movements, and Nature (Oxford University Press 2007). 
40 Iris Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton UP 1990). 
41 John Rawls, A theory of Justice (Harvard UP 2005).    
42 Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (n 40).  




and mis-recognition of certain social groups are key causes of injustice.  Due attention should 
be placed on the degree of fairness of the processes through which distribution occurs.44  
 
For Young, the legitimacy of a decision depends on the degree in which those affected by it 
have been included in the process and had power to influence the outcome.45 Therefore, to 
address injustices, the focus should be on the rules and procedures for maximising inclusion. 
In Inclusion and Democracy, Young proposes a version of deliberative democracy to maximise 
inclusion. She begins by differentiating between aggregative and deliberative models of 
democratic decision-making, favouring the latter.46 Aggregative models posit democratic 
decision-making as an expression and aggregation of different preferences whilst deliberative 
models consider decision-making as a space in which participants offer reasoned arguments in 
order to solve the issue at stake. Through authentic communication, the arguments put forward 
are tested, challenged and original positions transcended to arrive at the decision. As Young 
writes, ‘participants arrive at a decision not by determining what preferences have greatest 
numerical support, but by determining which proposals the collective agrees are supported by 
the best reasons’.47 She also argues for a decentred model of democracy in which deliberation 
cannot occur only within official institutions such as legislative bodies and the courts but also 
within associations and public spaces of the civil society.48 Communication should be flowing 
between these settings. The deliberative model Young presents is clearly influenced by 
Habermas’ theory of communicative action49 and by his analysis of the role of the public 
sphere.50 However, Young bypasses Habermas by moving away from an ideal speech situation. 
She does so by paying attention to the social and institutional elements that impede inclusion 
in deliberative fora.51 Due to social inequalities, some groups have more material or symbolic 
privileges than others, hence the definition of the common good is likely to express the views 
of the more powerful groups. Young distinguishes between forms of external and internal 
                                                          
44 Young, Inclusion and Democracy (n 39).    
45 ibid. 
46 ibid . 
47 ibid 24. 
48 ibid Ch 5. 
49 Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action: Volumes  I and II (Beacon Press 1984). 
50 Habermas defines the public sphere as: “a network for communicating information and points of view (i.e., 
opinions expressing affirmative or negative attitudes); the streams of communication are, in the process, filtered 
and synthesized in such a way that they coalesce into bundles of topically specified public opinions”. In the public 
sphere, problems of relevance to the whole society are discussed and influence the development of authoritative 
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exclusion.52 External exclusion refers to situation in which particular groups are excluded from 
participating in decision-making fora altogether. Wide inclusion in decision-making processes 
is key in overcoming external exclusion. Internal exclusion refers to situations of nominal 
inclusion in decision-making fora but de facto exclusion due to deafness towards particular 
voices and ways of expression. In addition to rational argumentation,  Young therefore 
proposes using techniques in decision-making fora to broaden the definition of what is suitable 
communication53For Young, ‘a theory of democratic inclusion requires an expanded 
conception of political communication, both in order to identify modes of internal inclusion 
and to provide an account of more inclusive possibilities of attending to one another in order 
to reach an understanding’.54   
 
She proposes three modes of communication so to mitigate internal exclusion: greetings, 
rhetoric and narrative.55 Greeting is the process of subject-to-subject 
recognition/acknowledgement that occurs prior to the expression of content by the subjects. 
Greeting is a preliminary step of great importance because it is through greeting that the 
subjects demonstrate their readiness to listen, mutual respect, and a willingness to take 
responsibility for their relations with the other subjects. Greetings are a useful communicative 
tool to establish trust. The explicit acknowledgement of others and their agency contributes 
others to be treated as subjects rather than objects. However, it is principally by introducing 
rhetoric as a mode of communication that Young challenges the supremacy of rational 
argumentation at the basis of Habermas’ theory. Rhetoric refers to forms of expressions that 
do not necessarily include speech, such as visual media and signs. These embodied and 
affective styles of expression for Young are to be included in communication because they 
bring forth the inherent historical and cultural specificity of perspectives and can recover the 
voices of those unable to communicate via rational argumentation. The purely rational 
discourse that is at the basis of Habermas’ theory is for Young an abstraction because it fails 
to recognise the situatedness of perspectives and the link between the emotive and the rational. 
56 Moreover, ‘the ideal of disembodied and disembedded reason [..] is a fiction. What such 
privileging takes to be neutral, universal, and dispassionate expression actually carries the 
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rhetorical nuances of particular situated social positions and relations’.57 Habermas’ distinction 
between the illocutionary and perlocutionary components of a speech act is not tenable 
according to Young. 58 If for Habermas, perlocutionary acts are to be associated with strategic 
manipulation and therefore should not be used in deliberation because they bring in an 
instrumental element, Young argues that it is arbitrary to distinguish between the two because 
every speech act uses also rhetorical speech (the perlocutionary component) as the speaker 
aims to produce a particular effect on the audience.59 The use of rhetoric should not be equated 
with an attempt to instrumentalise the decision-making process but can be used more positively 
to further understanding, to emphasise the importance of an issue and to contextualise claims 
and arguments. Also, narrative as understood by Young helps in situating perspectives and 
share experiences and knowledges that may otherwise go unheard. Through storytelling, the 
speakers provide the context for their position and this helps the listeners correcting 
assumptions about them. Also, as the stories told are stories about people’s relationships with 
other people, they provide situated knowledge, contributing to the growth of overall social 
knowledge, when combined with other narratives from different perspectives. To the criticisms 
that these modes of communication can be manipulative, Young insists that they should not be 
seen as replacing rational communication but as complementing it in an enlarged conception 
of democratic engagement.60 Indeed, rhetoric accompanies argument, narratives are part of 
larger arguments and greetings precede the giving of reasons. In the work of Young, 
participatory decision-making is therefore both an element of justice (procedural justice) and a 
prerequisite for achieving (distributive) justice and minimising existing structural inequalities.  
 
Fraser also challenges the exclusive focus on distributional justice of classic justice theories by 
arguing for ‘the struggle for recognition’ and for ‘participatory parity’ of all affected by 
decision-making as the basis for justice.61 The cultural or institutional marginalisation of 
certain social groups and individuals is to be overcome by recognising such groups and 
individuals as equal participants in processes of decision-making. The dimensions of 
‘participatory parity’ that Fraser identifies are redistribution and recognition and, more 
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recently, representation.62 Redistribution refers to economic and social structures which 
overcome economic disparities and exploitation and recognition refers to institutionalised 
cultural patterns which grant individuals or groups equal respect. The addition of the third 
dimension of representation to Fraser’s ‘perspectival dualism’ is important as it attends to the 
political realm critically reviewing decision-making procedures, next to the cultural 
(recognition) and economic (redistribution). Representation through participatory procedures 
enables the resolution of contests in both the economic and the cultural dimensions.  
 
If Young and Fraser provide us with a convincing justification for putting procedural justice 
first, these theorists focus exclusively on justice for human actors, on social justice. Young and 
Fraser are concerned with the empowerment of marginalised social groups through inclusive 
processes of deliberation. For example, when Young discusses the use of narratives she refers 
to the social knowledge that can be accumulated through the reflection of encounters with other 
social actors.63 In the world of Young, narratives do not contain stories of human and nature 
interactions. The inclusion of non-human nature in considerations of justice is not a topic 
discussed by these scholars. Similarly, and perhaps more surprisingly, many environmental 
justice scholars have been anthropocentric in their focus, primarily preoccupied with the unjust 
distribution of environmental bads.64 This anthropocentric focus can however be explained by 
reference to the history of environmental justice movement, which was originally tied up with 
civil rights struggles of poor Afro-American communities in the United States in the 1970s and 
1980s.65 The focus was therefore on recording the experiences of marginalised communities 
exposed to high levels of environmental harms and addressing the injustices of environmental 
racism. Extending theories of procedural justice to new constituencies such as nature and future 
generations itself is challenging but, given that the focus of attention here is on the resilience 
of a social-ecological system, doing justice to the ecological component is as important as 
doing justice to the social one. Following a resilience perspective, social and ecological systems 
are interlinked and an anthropocentric approach falls short of recognising such systemic 
complexity. 
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3.2 Ecocentric Procedural Justice 
Schlosberg, a leading current environmental justice scholar, has attempted to move beyond the 
anthropocentric focus of the justice literature bringing non-human actors into his theory of 
justice.66 Schlosberg’s argument is influenced by Young and Fraser, inter alia, in that his theory 
of justice incorporates recognition and participation as key elements. However, he moves 
beyond Young and Fraser in applying the concept of recognition to nature itself.  As Schlosberg 
agues, extending justice to nature can be justified by disparate ethical positions that either 
assign intrinsic or instrumental value to nature. 67Indeed, extending justice to nature can be 
done using arguments for the recognition of nature’s integrity but also on the basis of expanded 
self-interest (as humans are part of nature, harming nature can affect also human well-being).68 
If there is no shortage of ethical perspectives to justify extending justice to nature, 
understanding how to translate this extension from the ethical plane to the governance one in a 
way that is reconcilable with an approach aimed at building resilience is much more 
problematic.  
 
In concretising these theoretical insights on justice to nature, the key problem encountered is 
that of representation.  As O’ Neill clearly put it,69 the problem of representation produces a 
number of normative questions: who is being represented in the political or decision-making 
process (individual or groups)? what is being represented (individual interests or common 
interests)? who is doing the representation (what is the relationship between the represented 
and representative)? and what is the source of legitimacy of the representation when traditional 
mechanisms of accountability are lacking as the represented (i.e. nature) cannot authorise and 
hold the representative to account?  These questions are difficult to answer because nature and 
future generations lack a voice of its own (presence) and cannot authorize or hold to account 
those representing their interests. 
Following Pitkin, representation can be defined in general terms as ‘making present in some 
sense of something which is nevertheless not present literally or in fact’.70 Elections within 
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nation-states are a traditional means of political representation of democratic countries. Elected 
representatives have the authority to act and are accountable to their constituencies. Indeed, 
authorization and accountability are the key elements of what Pitkin terms ‘formalistic 
representation’.71Authorization and accountability remain also the core elements of  
representation for Young, who argues, in line with a decentred approach, that accountability 
should be strengthen through processes of evaluation in both official institutions and in the 
public sphere, pluralising the sites in which accountability occurs.72 However, in complex 
social-ecological systems affected by change and uncertainty, new constituencies emerge that 
are not easily represented through traditional mechanisms.  Therefore, the preliminary question 
that needs addressing in this respect is: ‘how can these new constituencies be represented?’ A 
number of green political theorists have provided answers to this question by focussing on the 
representation of nature. Their insights can be helpful. Notable is the work of Dryzek, as well 
as Eckersley and Dobson.73 Dobson argued for direct representation of future generations and 
nature by proxy elected by constituencies in what he terms the  ‘environmental lobby’.74 For 
Dobson, proxy representatives can act as trustees for nature and future generations and be 
accountable delegates to the environmental lobby. As Dobson writes, in relation to the 
representation of future generations, a plausible approach to deciding the proxy is ‘to identify 
a lobby in the present generation that has its eyes firmly rooted on the future, as it were. One 
such lobby (admittedly hard to pin down) is that which argues in favour of environmental 
sustainability’.75 Dobson adopts the same logic in relation to the representation of other 
species.76 Therefore, Dobson seeks to enlarge the electoral system so to allow more group 
representations via proxy. However, in doing so, Dobson remains tied to the traditional and 
narrow focus of representative politics based on the legislature-constituency dyad and the 
traditional means of authorization and accountability. Indeed, for Dobson proxies 
representatives should be elected by proxy constituencies that comprise the environmental 
lobby, which is left undefined in his writing, and their representation of nature in decision-
making processes would be accountable to the proxy electorate.  
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As for Dryzek, he defends the representation of nature expanding Habermas’s theory of 
communicative rationality by transcending its anthropocentric focus.77 If for Habermas 
deliberation occurs in communication among rational human beings, for Dryzek there is no 
reason why communication should have a human source. As deliberation involves ‘reflection 
upon preferences induced by communication in non‐coercive fashion’78 and such reflection 
serves to enlarge individual thinking, there is no reason why the interested that are internalised 
during the process of enlargement need to be confined to those of humans.  Dryzek argues that 
extending communication to nature is possible if nature is treated as an agent. Agency should 
not be confused with subjectivity though, as self-awareness is a prerequisite of subjectivity. 
Dryzek writes:  
[…] the most effective and insidious way to silence others in politics is a refusal to listen, which is 
why the practice of effective listening has to be central to any discursive democracy. Recognition of 
agency in nature therefore means that we should listen to signals emanating from the natural world 
with the same sort of respect we accord communication emanating from human subjects, and as 
requiring equally careful interpretation.79  
To do so, two conditions need to be satisfied. The first is the capacity to be represented. Dryzek 
here makes an argument that is reminiscent of Dobson’s argument for proxies,80 arguing that 
as there are many human beings that cannot speak for themselves but are represented by proxy, 
so should the environment. Indeed, Dryzek states that ‘if nature cannot receive equality in the 
politics of presence, it can receive such treatments when it comes to politics of ideas’.81 The 
second is a capacity for effective and egalitarian listening, which also enables overcoming 
unequal power distribution.82 Extending participation to nature therefore involves both 
representatives of nature’s interests and a listening capacity manifested in the attention to 
feedback signals from natural systems.  Examples of institutional devices and techniques for 
listening to nature are, according to Eckersley, mandatory state of the environment reporting 
and environmental impact assessments to improve the flow of environmental information and 
the knowledge base on environmental matters.83 Indeed Eckersley argues that the interests of 
what she terms ‘differently situated others’ can be discovered by appropriate environmental 
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techniques alongside more ‘vernacular understandings of environmental problems’,84 thereby 
overcoming the epistemological challenge of representing nature.85  
 
3.3 Just Resilience 
Although the theorists considered above have provided interesting justifications and solution 
for the representation of non-human nature and future generations, Saward, embracing a 
constructivist understanding of representation, convincingly argues that these theories are 
underpinned by uni-directionality between the represented and the representative, with the 
latter occupying a passive role of listening to the interests of the represented object and only 
reporting those to the decision-making forum through appropriate techniques.86 Saward 
convincingly criticises Dryzek’s emphasis on listening to signals from the natural world 
because ‘listening implies passivity on the listener, mere receptiveness of what is given’87 as 
well as Eckerseley’s point that appropriate techniques, such as environmental monitoring,  are 
a means to listen to those interests.88  
The unidirectional view of representation is underpinned by an assumption of the existence of 
a set of pre-existing objective interests of the represented that the representative brings to the 
political realm. The theoretical discussions of green theorists such as Dryzek or Eckersley 
hence focus on the epistemological/linguistic challenges for discovering the interests of 
nature.89  
 
In contrast, Saward pushes for the acknowledgement of the role of the representative in 
contributing to the creation and framing of the views of the represented.90 For Saward, a thicker 
conception of representation is needed, one that is bi-directional rather than uni-directional, 
one that acknowledges the co-construction of the representative and the represented. 
Representation is understood by Saward as a process because it is linked with ‘the economy of 
claim-making rather than fact-establishing’.91 The focus is on claim making, rather than on 
whether the representative is advancing the pre-existing interests of the represented. Political 
representation for Saward becomes a performance involving many processes of claim making 
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(some official and some not) rather than a fact produced by elections. The representative 
subject does not merely report the interests of the represented but in representing those, s/he 
constructs them. Therefore, the role of the representative, our proxy, involves ‘evoking one or 
more potential versions of what is there to be represented’.92  
 
This view renders culturally available various ways of thinking about new constituencies, 
whether nature or future generations and shakes the presumption of stable and objectively 
knowable interests of such constituencies. At the core of Saward’s argument is a rejection of a 
conventional approach to representation, which consists in the subject (an individual or 
collective) standing up for, speaking for an object (the constituency). An example of the 
conventional approach would be an elected MP (subject) speaking for a constituency (object).   
Saward argues that this picture is reductive because it does not take into account of the fact that 
1) the individual or collective constructs or make the claim, 2) what is represented by the 
subject is not the actual constituency but an idea of the constituency, 3) there is an audience 
that accepts or rejects the claim. Hence, the maker of the claim puts forward a subject, who 
represents the object (his/her idea of the constituency) that is a (partial) account of the referent 
(the actual constituency) and the claim is offered to an audience. 93  As Saward puts it : ‘A 
maker of representations (‘M’) puts forward a subject (‘S’) which stands for an object (‘O’) 
that is related to a referent (‘R’) and is offered to an audience (‘A’)’.94 Distinguishing between 
the maker of a claim and the subject is noteworthy in highlighting that political representation 
is constitutive, ie who makes the claim needs to constitute himself/herself as a subject and 
he/she is not only representative by acting for a constituency, ie he/she is not simply  the proxy 
acting on behalf of the environmental lobby, as envisaged by Dobson.95 Similarly, 
distinguishing between the object and referent shows that what is represented is an idea of the 
represented, rather than the referent itself. This does not mean that representation is an act of 
invention but that the object in a representative claim is only one representation of the referent 
that can be contested by other representations brought forward by other subjects in claim-
making. Finally, the addition of the audience, whose role is to acknowledge or dismiss the 
claims made, is important as the object and the audience are not necessarily the same thing. 
The audience includes all those who ‘hear, hear about, read’ the claim and ‘respond to it in 
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some way’.96 For Saward, claim-making happen in a variety of fora, not only official ones 
following elections and the representative claim is circular in the sense that audiences are 
active, not merely passive recipients of the claims put forward by subjects.97  
 
The implications of Saward’s constructivist approach to representation for adaptive governance 
are far reaching. As Saward writes ‘a conception of representation which stresses its dynamic, 
claim-based character, its performative aspects as well as its narrowly institutional ones, and 
its potential for radical extension, can open up  new ways for us to think about political 
inclusion and a more pluralistic representative politics’.98 Saward’s point on the constitutive 
relationship between the represented and the representative permits us to acknowledge the 
plurality of objects that are constructed in the processes of representation and to argue for 
rendering them all available.  
 
These observations are also very useful in reflecting on the normative problems regarding the 
validity of representation of nature. As discussed above, representing new constituencies such 
as nature or future generations is problematic because of the absence of traditional means of 
authorisation and accountability. If the solution proposed by Dobson on proxies is not 
endorsed, all that is left is to use epistemic values as a source of legitimisation. This needs to 
be differentiated from the processes of knowledge-gathering advocated by the resilience 
scholars because those are underpinned more by an instrumentalist view, as explained above. 
The reliance on knowledge as a source of legitimisation is made by O’ Neill99 and it resonates 
also with the argument by Eckersley100 on familiar techniques such as the   state of environment 
reporting and environmental impact assessment touched upon above.  However, this raises two 
new questions. The first regards who holds the best knowledge to represent new constituencies 
such as nature. The classical debate between technocratic decision-making and the opening up 
of the decision-making space to other actors re-opens. From a deliberative and inclusive 
democratic perspective, as per Young, this question can be answered straightforwardly, 
advocating for the inclusion of different representatives of the environmental interests in the 
decision-making forum. The second question however is more difficult to answer because it 
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concerns, as O’Neill put it, ‘which knowledge claims are normatively relevant to the 
representation of nature’?101 Knowledge claims can be made regarding the welfare of 
individual species or the functioning of ecosystem, current environmental interest or potential 
future interests. Are these knowledge claims equally valid?   
 
Resilience thinking helps answering such questions. A resilience perspective, as discussed in 
the overview provided above, is centred on a systemic and dynamic view of social-ecological 
systems. At its core lies a recognition of the complex and dynamic interdependence between 
social and natural systems operating at different temporal and geographical scales, requiring 
adaptive governance and adaptive management strategies. It follows that knowledge claims 
that are normatively valid are those capable of representing such systemic complexity and 
dynamism, recognising and embracing change at different scales, favouring the maintenance 
of functions and services. Knowledge needs to be de-centred to mirror the multiple temporal 
and geographical scales of a complex social-ecological system. Indeed, specifically discussing 
the resilience of protected areas as a social-ecological system, Cumming and Allen state  
rather than thinking of conservation as an effort to either prolong the life of a dying patient or 
optimise particular variables (whether the number of species, returns on conservation dollars, or the 
design of protected areas), social-ecological system perspectives recognise the inevitability of 
change and also, in many cases, the need for it. This de-emphasizes the identity of individual species 
in favour of functions and services.102  
 
Moreover, the systemic emphasis of resilience thinking is in line with the inclusive ethics 
argued for above because the acknowledgement of knowledge claims arising from different 
scales is required to reflect the cross-scalar complexity of the systems. Cutting-edge scientific 
knowledge, potentially capable of displaying a more holistic/ecosystemic view, should be 
brought to the deliberative forum together with situated ecological knowledge because well 
suited to represent the local geographical and temporal scales. This is also in line with Saward’s 
point about the mutual constitutive relationship between the represented and the representative 
because different objects (whether ideas of natures, future generations, communities) can come 
to the fore through an inclusion of many knowledge claims from different makers, each reading 
the referent in different ways. Such constructions are subject to both social and ecological 
changes, so that the referents are also in the making. Indeed, new ecological systems develop 
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with climate change (eg species distribution changes) and new societal needs emerge due to a 
changing political-economy and ecological context.  One-off representations have a limited 
value. Deliberation should be an on-going practice responding to social-ecological changes and 
feedbacks at multiple scales. Therefore, we can infer that a just resilience perspective requires 
the representation of multiple readings of the referents by a variety of makers (not only green 
groups/NGOs) putting forward representative subjects at multiple scales backed up by 
collective monitoring and reviewing by both makers and audiences.103 Also, in line with 
Young, such readings should occur in different formats to enable different modes of 
communication and maximise internal inclusion. Rhetoric and narratives can be part of the 
communication used in deliberation. Visual media, signs etc. can be used to represent nature 
and narratives can be used to tell stories about specific and contextual nature-society 
interactions, contributing to the building of shared social-ecological knowledge. As for 
collective monitoring and reviewing, again following Young, this should take place in both 
official institutions and in the public sphere, decentralising every stage of deliberation to mirror 
the scales of the social-ecological system under scrutiny. Such decentring should however 
avoid dispersion so that mechanisms for bringing together decentred deliberation and decentred 
monitoring should be found.  
 
What are the implications of this theoretical discussion for environmental law? How can we 
design laws that are underpinned by a just resilience perspective? The key is to avoid 
suppressing plurality by enabling multiple representative claims to be made regarding nature 
and future generations. The aim to recognise diverse understandings, constructions and 
interests acknowledging the process-oriented nature of representation to achieve procedural 
justice. As Schlosberg writes, ‘such recognition and participation is not only an argument for 
expanded ecological democracy, but is also an integral element in achieving justice as well’.104   
 
Therefore, just resilience in environmental law is more likely to be achieved when the law 
guarantees inclusive procedures to recognise the diversity of actors and knowledges and the 
diversity of modes of communication coupled with strict collective monitoring and reviewing 
in a variety of official and unofficial fora. Indeed, given the plurality and complexity described, 
the law needs to contain provisions for ensuring the flexibility of interventions and enable 
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revision of measures adopted in the light of new perspectives, new knowledge, new 
constructions of nature and societies and new physical changes. The law’s role is a facilitative 
and responsive one: setting in place procedural mechanisms to allow different versions of the 
referents to be represented and to put in place collective monitoring and reviewing techniques 
to revise decisions in response to cross-scalar social-ecological changes. Adaptive governance 
needs to be polycentric. State institutions continue to be relevant but also institutions at other 
scales, with different degree of formality mirroring the scales of the social-ecological system.  
The accountability gaps this flexible procedural system creates are overcome through the 
monitoring and evaluation happening in the public sphere where the  ‘audiences’ described by 
Saward have an active role  capable of challenging claims made by the makers and are part of 
the public sphere and through the construction of shared social-ecological knowledge given 
that, following O’Neill, when traditional forms of accountability and authorization are lacking, 
valid knowledge becomes a source of legitimisation. In any case, just resilience is based on a 
contingent politics, on an understanding of decision-making as a process of becoming rather 
than a finished product. The next and final section of the article brings the threads of the 
argument together and provides some suggestions for future research on just resilience and 
environmental law.   
 
4. CONCLUSION 
This article has provided a contribution to law and resilience literature and resilience 
scholarship in general, by making a first attempt at discussing issues of inclusion and 
representation in adaptive governance, employing justice lenses. Resilience literature has long 
emphasised the importance of participation in adaptive governance primarily from an 
instrumental view point, ie participation as a means to fill in the scientific knowledge gaps in 
complex systems. More recently, law and resilience literature has connected participation to 
legitimacy, defined as social acceptability of a decision. This has enabled resilience scholars to 
discuss participation more holistically beyond a purely instrumentalist focus. However, the 
normative questions of who should be represented and why have not been answered in the 
existing literature.   
 
Drawing on procedural theories of justice and green political thinking, this article has 
contended that putting the accent on inclusive decision-making, rather than focussing from the 
start on who the social and ecological beneficiaries should be, is a helpful initial step for 




minimise external and internal inclusion in decision-making. Secondly, the article has claimed 
that given resilience’s focus on complex social-ecological systems entailing different temporal 
and geographical scales, new constituencies need to be represented in governance and decision-
making (eg natures, future generations).   
 
Building on Saward’s theory of the representative claim,105 this article has argued that 
representation is more an event/performance than a fact and that representatives (whether proxy 
or otherwise) are not only listening to the pre-existing interests of particular referents (be these 
nature or future generations) but, through claim-making, contribute to the creation of the 
objects of the representation (the ideas of nature/future generations), which are offered to active 
audiences. Such a constructivist view has important implications for rethinking the role of 
environmental law and governance in fostering the resilience of social-ecological systems. The 
key one is that it is not enough to develop techniques (such as state of the environment 
monitoring and environmental impact assessments) to listen to the interests of nature, as per 
Dryzek106 and Eckersley107 and incorporate them in decision-making. Also, it is not enough to 
have proxies elected from environmental lobbies as per Dobson108 because the dynamic view 
of representation put forward by Saward moves beyond traditional mechanisms of 
accountability of representative politics and beyond an assumption of pre-existing fixed 
interests. As Saward points out, this social constructivist view should not be taken to the 
extreme arguing that there are no referents prior to the constitution in politics. It should be 
interpreted as meaning that the objects of the representation vary depending on the maker of 
the claim and that claims can be made in a number of contexts, also outside the state and 
elections. As Saward puts it, ‘of course people and groups exist prior to evocation or 
constitution in politics. There is always a referent. But the real political work lies in the active 
constitution of constituencies – the making of representations’.109 In a complex social-
ecological system, claim-making regarding a system’s resilience can and should occur in 
multiple, more or less, official spaces and by a number of actors.   The role of the law is to 
facilitate such plurality of claim making and put in place mechanisms for reviewing decisions 
following the changes undergone by the system. In order to do so, the law will need to set in 
place strategies such as collective monitoring and reviewing of the system’s resilience and the 
                                                          
105 Saward, The Representative Claim (n 91). 
106 Dryzek (n 74). 
107 Eckersley, The Green State (n 74). 
108 Dobson, ‘Representative Democracy’ (n 74). 




inclusion of different actors and knowledge claims in on-going deliberative fora in official 
settings and in the public sphere to increase representation at different scales of the social-
ecological system and in so doing achieve procedural justice.  
 
As the article demonstrated, dynamism and learning are at the core of a resilience approach, 
demanding both governance and management to be adaptive with solid provisions for 
monitoring, reviewing and re-assessing existing measures. Justice, as interpreted and defined 
in this article, adds to the resilience perspective a focus on broad inclusion and representation 
of both human and non-human actors and knowledge claims. Flexible and participatory 
procedures to account for the plurality and changes in (constructions) of social-ecological 
systems is a prerequisite for distributive justice because deliberation can include discussion on 
a just distribution of law’s benefits (to natures and to humans) and costs (to natures and to the 
humans). 
 
On a more cautionary note, it should be stressed, as Craig and Ruhl also mention,110 that the 
implications of a just resilience perspective may be more relevant for certain sectors of 
environmental law than others. Not all environmental law is concerned with dynamic and 
complex social-ecological systems. Consequently, the facilitative role of the law in enabling 
practices of collective monitoring and reviewing and inclusive claim-making may not be 
appropriate in every case and for facing any type of environmental threat . This article has 
presented a sketch of the perspective of just resilience, focussing on theoretical issues and 
focusing on the representation of the various components of the social-ecological system. It is 
the task of future research to consider how such perspective enable us to assess and rethink 
substantive sectors of environmental law in the context of global environmental change and 
what legal tools are best capable of securing just resilience.  
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